Purpose: The present research aims to analyse and compare how austerity has influenced online sustainability information in Italy and Spain.
Introduction
Governments are facing austerity with increasing cuts in their budgets at a time when their incomes are decreasing and there is an increase in the demand for public services (Alt and Lowry, 2010; Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Overmans and Noordegraaf, 2014) . "Since the crisis has structural reasons, any reasonable plan to solve it needs to address them and to use the language of transparency" (Caperchione et al., 2014, p.135) . To inform citizens of the reasons behind these policies and to promote democratic participation may help governments to legitimize their policies (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007) . Governments are using the information and communication technologies (ICT) to enable and promote citizen participation in policy formulation and evaluation and to encourage greater information exchange between citizens and government (Macintosh and Whyte, 2008) .
This research aims to analyse the dissemination of online information related to sustainability (including both financial and non-financial aspects) of Italian and Spanish local governments (LGs) in an era of austerity. The study attempts to identify the degree to which governments carrying out austerity policies have adopted the appropriate communication strategies. Our main contribution is the study of the impact of austerity on online information and the comparative perspective of the determinants of local government transparency.
Italy and Spain have introduced austerity policies promoted by the European Union and both have recently passed transparency laws. The two countries have similar cultural and administrative traditions, which may drive the way people think and act (Hofstede, 2001 ).
Nevertheless, some contextual and institutional factors (e.g. density of population, education, engagement in political activities, legal framework) as well as citizen predisposition towards governments (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013) can create differences in the way in which LGs tackle the need for increasing transparency in times of austerity, and these factors deserve to be investigated.
3
The analysis covers all Italian and Spanish LGs with more than 100,000 inhabitants. We have considered the Global Reporting Initiative's sustainability reporting framework (supplement for public agencies, GRI 2010), as a reference to select the information on organizational, financial, social and environmental aspects published by LG on their websites. We related some characteristics of LGs and austerity measures (in terms of changes in the level of taxes, revenues, capital expenditure and debts) to investigate the relation -if any -between austerity policies and online information.
The research is organized as follows. Section two presents an overview of the literature on austerity and online information used to design the hypotheses that are then tested in the study. Section three describes the Italian and Spanish contexts while section four presents the research methodology. The empirical results are shown in section five. Section six is devoted to a discussion of the results and the main implications.
Transparency and online information in local government
Transparency has become a key factor in the reforms of public administrations around the world (Hood, 2006; Piotrowski and van Ryzin, 2007; Guillamón et al., 2011; Meijer, 2013) , as well as being a means of reacting to austerity (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012) . According to the literature, transparency can be defined from the principal-agent theory, considering it as "the ability to find out what is going on inside a public sector organization through avenues such as open meetings, access to records or the proactive posting of information on Web sites" (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007, p. 308) or from an institutional perspective as "the availability of information about an actor that allows other actors to monitor the workings or performance of the first actor" (Meijer, 2013, p. 430) . In both cases, citizens should be considered not only as recipients of the activities of public entities but also as collaborative partners for building democratic and effective governance (O'Leary et al., 2010) . Consequently, LGs tend to enhance transparency while citizens require an increasing amount of information, possibly including access to all public documents and deliberations which can have consequences for the management of resources (García-Sánchez et al., 2013) . However, we must be aware that transparency does not always produce the benefits claimed for it and that it may provoke some negative effects.
In the literature, there is an ongoing debate on this question (transparency optimists versus transparency pessimists, Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011: 36; or proponents versus opponents, Meijer, 2009) . Some empirical studies provide evidence that transparency does not always lead to greater participation (Welch, 2012) or to an increase in citizen trust (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013) . Curtin and Meijer (2006, p. 120) include some interesting arguments urging caution on the question of transparency: few citizens access the information provided and those that do are confronted with an information overload; the information could result in more negative stories in the press and undermine legitimacy; and transparency can be used as an excuse by policymakers to stick to strict procedures and avoid innovative solutions. Bearing in mind these possible limitations, our research does not intend to test the consequences of transparency, but rather to depict the extent to which information is released on the websites of Italian and Spanish LGs in times of austerity.
Factors driving online information
The motivations of governments to disclose information have been argued in the literature from different theoretical approaches (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2009; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2014 ) that can be used as a motivation of our study.
First, the increasing interest in accountability and transparency by LG can be explained by the legitimacy theory (i.e. Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Roberts, 1992 (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975) .
Furthermore, decision makers may increase their legitimacy simply by carefully justifying their decisions after they have been taken behind closed doors (de Fine Licht et al., 2011) . In fact, people informed about decisions affecting their everyday lives are more willing to accept the process by which the decisions have been taken if they are given an insight into the reasoning behind the decisions. Therefore,
LGs should consider what is acceptable to citizens and, at the same time, release more information to explain the results obtained. The application of the legitimacy theory in an era of austerity may lend support to the idea that the introduction of transparency can help governments to obtain legitimacy in spite of the adoption of measures that involve sacrifices from citizens, both in terms of higher taxes and fewer services or investments.
Other scholars have framed the determinants of transparency within the boundaries of the agency theory Gandía and Archidona, 2008) : citizens act as the principal while managers and politicians are the agent. Online information may reduce uncertainty about the agent's behaviour, thereby making the principal more confident in delegating powers to the agent (Holmström, 1979) . Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2014) argue that online sustainability information is influenced by media pressure as most of the news published focuses on negative issues, so entities under closer scrutiny by the media are less inclined to disclose information.
However, the interest of politicians in disseminating information will depend on the level of interest shown by the citizens which, in turn, is reflected in their engagement and political participation. Moreover, from a principal-agent perspective, it is possible to relate fiscal 6 revenues and fiscal pressure -which are the typical means of austerity policies -with the dissemination of information (Ferejohn, 1999) Another strand of the literature (Ball and Grubnic, 2009 ) has interpreted the increasing production of information from the perspective of the new institutional theory. This theory emphasizes the existence of isomorphism to explain changes, suggesting that governments will be pushed into different practices by isomorphism, trying to do what other similar governments do. With regard to sustainability reporting, Mussari and Monfardini (2010) consider the adoption and diffusion of tools such as social, environmental or gender reporting in the Italian public administrations as an isomorphic process triggered by normative processes, mimetic isomorphism and coercive mechanisms.
In accordance with the theories mentioned, the influence of austerity should be similar in Italian and Spanish LGs. Nevertheless, some differences may emerge in a comparative study due to certain internal characteristics. In fact, as already shown by scholars (Marcuccio and Steccolini, 2009), LGs are affected by various contingent factors in disclosing information (e.g., educational level, internal culture, citizen engagement, etc.) which may differ, especially between countries. Thus, it is worth testing whether these differences exist.
Development of hypothesis
Previous studies have shown that the information provided on LG websites has increased over time in response to a number of factors Caba et al., 2008; Alt and Lowry, 2010; Albalate del Sol, 2013; García-Sánchez et al., 2013) . Scholars have generally promoted the idea of increasing transparency as a means of reducing the risk of corruption and of enhancing accountability, as well as a result of democratic participation (Yetano et al., 2010) . Under austerity policies, transparency through online information can be interpreted as a way of explaining political choices and the value for money of public services. Looking at cutback policies, we would expect that a reduction both in capital expenditure and in total 7 expenditure would lead entities to release more information, both to justify the rationality of their choices and to gain legitimacy as well as to give a proper explanation of the way in which resources have been employed. In addition, we want to test whether there are differences between Italian and Spanish LGs in the impact of austerity measures.
Thus, we can set our first and second hypotheses as follows:
Hypotheses1: The entities with a higher decrease in capital expenditure disseminate more information.
Hypothesis 2: The entities with a higher decrease in total expenditure disseminate more information.
In an era of austerity, transfers by central government and revenues tend to be reduced. Even if LGs can exercise stronger fiscal pressure, this cannot compensate for the reduction of transfer and other revenues. As a consequence, the total amount of revenues tends to be reduced year by year. In this situation, the rationality offered by the theoretical framework adopted suggests that entities should provide more detailed explanations about the use of financial resources as well as sustainability matters. Thus, keeping our comparative perspective, we set the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The entities with a higher decrease in total revenues disseminate more information.
From a principal-agent perspective, it is possible to relate an increase in fiscal revenues -due to higher fiscal pressure per capita -with the dissemination of information: citizens want to know how their money has been spent. Ferejohn (1999) evidences a positive relation between taxes and the demand for transparency. Guillamón et al. (2011) demonstrate that in Spain municipalities collecting more taxes disclose more financial information. However, in the same context, Caba et al. (2008) found no significant influence. Thus, we intend to test the following hypothesis in a comparative perspective: Austerity policies aim to produce a reduction in government debt, both at central and local level (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012) . In line with legitimacy theory, LGs that act within what is considered legally and socially acceptable will be more interested in disseminating information. Similarly, agency theory states that in entities that behave responsibly the agents will be more interested in giving information to the principal to reduce uncertainty. In the literature, some scholars have found that financial and social information has been adopted as a tool to inform about the financial equilibrium and to access public funds (Marcuccio and Steccolini, 2005; Guillamón et al., 2011) .
Consequently, we can expect that a reduction in the level of debt will lead to greater financial disclosure as a result of a successful application of austerity policies. Previous studies (Evans and Patton, 1987; Fisher et al., 2005) have discussed the association between debt and the voluntary disclosure of public financial information. Albalate del Sol (2013) shows that the debt level has no effect on fiscal transparency. Similarly, Guillamón et al. (2011) LGs debt increase, the transparency decreases.
Thus, always from a comparative point of view, our last hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 5: The entities with a higher decrease in the level of indebtedness disseminate more information.
To strengthen our analysis, several control variables representing the municipal context (transfer for capital expenditure per capita) and internal factors (citizen engagement and educational level) have been added to our model, following the extant literature.
In the context of austerity, the interest of politicians in disseminating information will also depend on the level of interest shown by citizens which, in turn, is reflected in their engagement and political participation. Previous studies demonstrate that there is a close interconnection between transparency and political participation Bertelli, 2010, Yetano et al. 2010 ).
Moreover, the educational level of the population has also been considered as a determinant of a demand for greater transparency Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007) . Taking into account the relation between education level and transparency, we expect that well-educated people are more likely to demand innovation and greater transparency from their LGs (Tolbert et al., 2008) .
Lastly, we include size as a control variable to verify to what extent there are differences between larger entities and medium-sized entities. Some prior research shows that municipalities with larger populations have a greater dissemination of information (Pina et al., 2009; Albalate del Sol, 2013) .
The legal framework in Italy and Spain
In Italy and Spain, public administrations have been driven to introduce significant cuts in budgets in the last few years because of the financial crisis (so called Spending review). This situation, coupled with the high level of corruption perceived by citizens in both countries (Survey by TNS Opinion & Social for the European Commission, 2014), has meant that transparency has been a priority of governments. 
Transparency and Online Information in Italy
The Italian public administration has a three-tier structure: National Government, Regional Governments (21) and Local Governments, comprising 110 Provinces and 8,092
Municipalities, most of which have few inhabitants, as Table 1 As regards social and environmental reporting, even if it is not mandatory, there are three main guidelines that a large number of ILGs tend to follow (Secchi, 2006) 
Transparency and Online Information in Spain
The political structure of Spain consists of a state level, the regional level (17 Autonomous Communities) and local level (52 provinces and 8116 municipalities). In Spain, as in Italy, the majority of the municipalities are small.
In Spain, the law 19/2013, on "Transparency, access to public information and good governance" requires the publication of institutional, organizational and planning information, juridical information and economic, budgetary and statistical information. The law gives regional and local governments a period of two years to adapt to the compulsory requirements. It makes no mention of how the information should be published, missing the opportunity to require the use of open data standards such as those of the World Wide Web Consortium.
In the environmental area, the law 27/2006 aimed to facilitate the gradual diffusion of environmental information to the public, but not all public entities publish such information, which are still voluntary (García-Sánchez et al, 2013) .
Previous studies have mainly analysed the transparency of economic and financial information, showing that there are significant differences in transparency between Spanish local governments (SLG) (Gandía and Archidona, 2008; International Transparency-Spain, 2013 ). There are very few papers that deal with the publication of sustainability information in SLG (Navarro et al., 2010; García-Sánchez et al., 2013) , but all available studies conclude that local entities have limited experience of providing social and environmental information (Navarro et al., 2010; García-Sánchez et al., 2013) .
Research methodology
In order to investigate what information is published by local governments, we have analysed the websites of all Italian and Spanish LGs with more than 100,000 inhabitants, assuming that larger municipalities have greater economic and technological resources and that they are responsible for large communities, so would publish more information than smaller ones (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2009; Tagesson et al., 2013) . The sample originally comprised 46
Italian and 59 Spanish LGs, but we had to eliminate two Italian entities due to the lack of some financial data.
We have constructed an index of total disclosure using as a reference the Supplement for Public Agencies of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2010) and following the same method already used in previous studies (Caba et al., 2008; Gallego-Álvarez et al., 2011) . Table 2 . We have also included the expected sign of the variables, according to the definition of the hypothesis.
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We have also introduced some control variables to capture the influence of other financial factors representing the municipal context (transfers for capital expenditure per capita) and internal factors (citizen engagement and education level).
In order to test to what extent these variables behave differently in Italian and Spanish LGS, we have included the interaction of all the variables in the table with the country.
[TABLE 2HERE]
To analyse the effect of the independent variables on the total disclosure index, we have constructed a model of dependency, using multiple linear regression, as follows: In order to identify whether a stronger relation exists between any specific area of our disclosure index and the independent variables selected, the model has been repeated for each of the four areas. The model parameters in the study were estimated using SPSS software.
The regression has been estimated using the stepwise procedure. To check the robustness of the results, we tested whether the selected models fulfill the assumptions for linear regression: Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for each group into which the information index has been clustered, as well as the total index for both countries. The analysis is based on the mean of the items disclosed for the two countries.
Analysis of Results

Online Information in Spanish and Italian Local Governments
[TABLE 3 HERE]
As can be seen, the level of information is low in most of the areas: in Italy the mean is over fifty percent of the items only for organization profile, strategy and governance information (61.63%); while in Spain the percentage is over fifty percent of the items only for environmental information (53.50%).
In particular, concerning the first area Italian and Spanish entities disclose more information about the operational structure of the organization, the governance structure and the political managers, whereas disclosure of information about challenges and targets for the entity is still low in both countries (see Appendix 1).
In financial information, around 44.41% (44.48% in Italy and 44.57% in Spain) of the items are disclosed in both countries. Nearly all entities disclose the initial approved budget, while the percentage of entities that publish the execution of the budget is only 45.45% in Italy and 64.41% in Spain (details in the Appendix 1). The balance sheet and operative statement are also disclosed by a high percentage of entities, especially in the case of Italy. This area contains a higher percentage of the total items analysed (21 out of 52) and the results show that it represents a relevant percentage in the total disclosure of LG. This result confirms the relevance of financial information in the transparency of LGs (Navarro et al, 2010; García-Sánchez et al, 2013) , as it is one of the most important components of public accountability.
Analysing the dissemination of social information, it can be seen that LGs on average disclose about 5 items (45.64% in ILGs and 43.18% in SLGs). The mean value for disclosure of social information is slightly higher for Italy than for Spain.
Lastly, examining the dissemination of environmental information, results show a wider disclosure in Spain, since it can be observed that ILGs on average disclose about 1item (30.00%) while SLGs disclose about 2 (53.50%).
In order to compare the situation in the two countries, Levene's test and the T-test have been 
[TABLE 4 HERE]
In Italy, this relation can be explained by the fact that laws related to the diffusion of financial information have also invited entities to disclose social information as well as information concerning the organization and management of each public administration.
The production of a separate sustainability report is voluntary and the widespread availability of these reports could also be read as a result of institutional pressure coming from the European Commission which has issued a variety of communications to encourage
LGs to adopt sustainability strategies and to voluntarily report on these activities (Farneti et al, 2010 ).
The behaviour of Italian and Spanish
LGs can also be considered in the light of the legitimacy theory (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975) because LGs disclose social and environmental information in order to demonstrate to citizens that their activities are consistent with citizens' expectations (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975) . In Spain, entities that want to be transparent include the three types of information, confirming previous research results ( García-Sánchez et al., 2013) . Table 5 shows results of the regression analysis for each area as well as for the total disclosure. Considering that we have ten independent variables and that our aim is to select those that have greater explanatory power over the dependent variable, the stepwise model regression has been used to select the predictive variables with an automatic procedure (Hopkins and Ferguson, 2014) .
Drivers for online information in an austerity context
[TABLE 5 HERE]
As can be seen, for the overall level of information, there are three significant variables: The first variable has a positive sign, showing that a higher level of transfers for capital expenditure is linked to a higher level of social transparency. The effect is also different in each country, being higher in Spain than in Italy. The second variable, with a negative sign, shows that entities that have reduced their investments are more interested in offering information about the salaries of the politicians and in the use of democratic participative tools that can make citizens aware of austerity policies.
Finally, our results show that environmental reporting is not influenced by austerity measures.
Therefore, the municipality's budgetary capacity is not a major determinant for greater environmental transparency (García-Sánchez et al, 2013) . The only significant variable is the 19 size of the local governments*country. The positive and significant relationship between size and environmental disclosure is consistent with previous results obtained by Frost and Semaer (2002) and García-Sánchez et al, (2013) . Largest municipalities have introduced more tools for management (Torres et al. 2011 ) and can have more possibilities for environmental disclosure. The effect is different in each country, higher in Spain than in Italy. Therefore, as already shown before, Spanish entities pay more attention to this kind of data.
Of the five variables chosen to analyse the influence of austerity measures on transparency, the relative variation of capital expenditure (as a proxy of austerity) is the only significant one with respect to social information, so our first hypothesis can be partially accepted.
The third hypothesis can be accepted: focusing on the results of the overall disclosure and organization disclosure, entities facing a reduction in their revenues are more likely to give more information to justify their policies and, especially, to explain how this can affect organizational aspects. Fiscal pressure also influences the level of disclosure of LGs in the area of organizational information. Entities with higher fiscal pressure give more information to citizens, which leads us to accept -although partially -our fourth hypothesis. This confirms the results obtained previously by Ferejohn (1999) which indicated a positive correlation between the amount of taxes and the transparency level of public entities.
However, the relative variations in total expenditure and in the debt have not been significant in the model and consequently our second and fifth hypotheses should be rejected.
However, the results show that the variation in debt per capita has no influence on the dissemination of information by Italian and Spanish LGs. In the literature there is a debate on this issue. Some previous research results ( Lassen, 2006, Albalate del Sol, 2013) have indicated that the level of debt is not significant while others (Evans and Patton, 1987; 20 Fisher et al., 2005) have revealed a positive relation between debt and the disclosure of public financial information. Finally, our results show that transparency is related neither to political participation, thus diverging from previous studies (Piotrowski and Bertelli, 2010 ), nor to the educational level. The latter is line with the results of Caba et al. (2008) for Spain.
Conclusions
LGs are facing austerity and cutbacks in their budgets, which has motivated a public debate about whether these policies are appropriate or not. Informing citizens of the reasons behind these policies and promoting democratic participation may help governments to legitimize their policies. However, there is no information available about how austerity can influence transparency in practice.
Italy and Spain have both introduced austerity policies driven by the European Union and both have recently passed transparency laws as a tool for fighting corruption, requiring public administrations to inform citizens about their activities. Furthermore, both countries have similar cultural and administrative traditions, but some country-specific factors could create some differences (Marcuccio and Steccolini, 2009; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013) 
An analysis of the websites of all Italian and Spanish
LGs with more than 100,000 inhabitants has highlighted that the objectives of transparency have only partially been met, and that differences arise between different information areas. In fact, the area with the highest level of disclosure is that of organizational profile, strategy and governance. On the other hand, financial information has average values which reveal that governments disclose under 50% of the items analyzed. Disclosure of social and environmental information is also 21 low. This shows that in spite of the political promotion of transparency as being a principal objective of the parties in power and its continual emphasis in social networks and the media, in practice there is still room for improvement.
In Italy laws requiring greater disclosure of information have progressively been introduced in the last few years, including a comprehensive Transparency Law, while in Spain such information disclosure will be mandatory in 2016, possibly producing further changes in entities that, at present, do not even publish their budgets. Nevertheless, the differences between the two countries are limited, apparently supporting the idea that mimetic is even stronger than coercive isomorphism.
Our results show that austerity measures -in particular as far as they affect the relative variation in total revenues, in capital expenditure and capital expenditure per capita -have influenced the disclosure of information. These results can be interpreted through the lens of the legitimacy theory: entities facing greater austerity are more interested in informing citizens in order to gain their trust and obtain legitimization. Moreover, from the agency theory perspective, politicians and managers, as agents, give more information to citizens (principals) in a context of austerity in an attempt to reduce uncertainty and consequently gain consensus. It is, however, difficult to assess whether or not greater transparency has really increased legitimacy and to evaluate the persuasive effects of transparency.
The study does have a further limitation due to the fact that many other variables that potentially affect disclosure could be considered, and these would probably enhance the explanatory power of the models. In any case, our objective was not to explain the level of releases and other media) as well as for policy makers and regulators to support the enhancement of such information. In future research, it would be of interest to test whether those entities with higher transparency have in fact achieved more legitimacy or not and to examine the effects that transparency can have in practice. A further development of this research could be a comparison between countries belonging to different administrative systems, to verify whether stronger differences in transparency arise. This is a field that deserves more empirical analysis. 
